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CAN EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
CONFIRM ORIGINAL SIN?
John T. Mullen

Christian responses to the developing field of evolutionary psychology tend
to be defensive, focusing on the task of showing that Christians have not been
presented with any reason to abandon any central beliefs of the Christian
faith. A more positive response would seek to show that evolutionary psy
chology can provide some sort of epistemic support for one or more distinc
tively Christian doctrines. This paper is an attempt to supply such a response
by focusing on the distinctively Christian doctrine of original sin, which
presents itself as an especially likely candidate for support from evolution
ary psychology. I consider five versions of the doctrine in order of increasing
content, arguing that all but the last can receive such support. However, in
order to argue for the fourth version (which includes the doctrine tradition
ally described as "original guilt"), I enlist the aid of a Molinist understanding
of divine providence. A consequence of this application of Molinism is that
God holds us morally accountable, not only for what we actually do, but also
for what we would do in any non-actual conditions, and that He acts on His
knowledge of what we would do in such conditions. Because many may find
this consequence problematic, I also argue that it is both morally acceptable
and necessary for the perfection of the relationship between God and human
beings. The last version of original sin that I consider insists that it must be the
causal product of the first sin of the first human being(s), but I argue that this
is not a reasonable alternative if original sin is to be equated with behavioral
tendencies inherited from an evolutionary ancestry.

Most contemporary Christian scholarship regarding the relationship be
tween the emerging field of evolutionary psychology and the Christian
faith focuses on potential conflicts between the two. Evolutionary expla
nations for various ethical or religious beliefs and behaviors are frequently
evaluated for compatibility with Christian explanations for the same. The
two explanations may be judged to be in some sense incompatible, thus
requiring some sort of adjudication. Or it may be argued that an evolu
tionary explanation can be accepted without thereby acquiring a reason
to abandon or significantly alter one's distinctively Christian beliefs, de
spite an abundance of claims to the contrary. But in either case the field
of evolutionary psychology is viewed as a potential threat to Christian
faith, and the task is to offer a defense in the face of the threat. All of this
work is important, necessary, and illuminating. It is understandable and
perhaps even inevitable that a defensive response should be the first order
of business, especially in view of the more outlandish and often intemper
ate anti-religious claims of some evolutionary psychologists. But thus far
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the Christian community has given little to no attention to the ways in
which evolutionary psychology might offer some sort of epistemic support
for distinctively Christian doctrines (and thus also for the Christian faith
itself). I take it that this is an undesirable state of affairs that requires cor
rection. If there is anything to the old adage that the best defense is a good
offense, then the Christian community should begin to explore the possi
bility of finding support for the Christian faith in evolutionary psychology.
This paper, then, is a preliminary attempt to do just that. Though I will
focus exclusively on the distinctively Christian doctrine of original sin, I
certainly do not mean to suggest that the prospects for discovering such
support relations are limited to that doctrine.
I submit that the doctrine of original sin presents itself immediately as
an obvious candidate for support from the science of evolutionary psychol
ogy. Those to whom this claim does not seem obvious are very probably
conceiving of original sin in one of its more specific and historically con
troversial forms. And I concede that as one adds content to the doctrine, it
does indeed become more difficult to see how it can be supported by evo
lutionary psychology. Indeed, one might think that it becomes so difficult
as to make it obvious that it is not so supported. Nevertheless, I will shortly
consider most of the historic versions of original sin in order of increasing
content, and argue that all but one of them can indeed be rendered more
epistemically probable upon the addition of evolutionary psychology to
one's belief structure. It will turn out, perhaps unsurprisingly, that this
relation of epistemic support depends a great deal on which beliefs are
already sitting in one's belief structure when one takes up the inquiry.
Let us begin by considering a minimal version of original sin and con
vincing ourselves that we really ought to be able to support it with the sim
plest and least controversial consequences of evolutionary psychology:
(OS1) Human beings generally1 inherit at conception a set of conditions
that make it very likely that they will sin2when they reach a cer
tain point of moral maturity.
OS1 is very weak in content. Because it is so weak, it is very easy to see in
it a deep consonance with an evolutionary inheritance. Christians are very
frequently admonished, by Scripture, Tradition, and by the many sermons
they hear, to be ever on their guard against the moral corruption they pos
sess by nature. We are told that we must never assume that all our natural
inclinations are morally good and right, but must learn to distinguish the
good from the bad within ourselves, i.e., even from among our internal in
clinations. And now our latest science is telling us that we have inherited
from our ancestors certain behavioral tendencies that lead us to protect
and serve our own interests at others' expense, to preserve and enhance
our own reproductive fitness relative to others, etc. As Langdon Gilkey puts
it, we have "genetic influences that lead us to competitiveness, brutality,
violence, selfishness, and hedonism."3And as Keith Ward puts it, "If.. .one
sees human persons as having become a dominant species by being more
efficient at replicating, obtaining scarce energy supplies, and eliminat
ing competitors in the struggle for life, then it is perfectly understand
able that they should have strong drives to sexuality, possessiveness, and
aggression. Instead of sin being almost impossible to account for, it may
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seem that it is goodness which now becomes virtually impossible. Lust,
greed, and aggression are the natural inheritance of every human. How
then could anyone escape their power?"4 Even popularizations of evolu
tionary psychology occasionally read like secular sermons, admonishing
readers to beware lest we be deceived by our evolutionary inheritance into
mistaking merely selfish impulses for what we really ought to do.5 And,
perhaps ironically, this close fit between inherited behavioral tendencies
and moral turpitude was not lost on some important early defenders of
evolutionary theory. John Stuart Mill, for example, thought it was obvious
that "if Nature and Man are both the works of a Being of perfect goodness,
that Being intended Nature as a scheme to be amended, not imitated, by
Man."6And even Thomas Huxley, known primarily for his aggressive de
fense of Darwinism, tells us that "the ethical progress of society depends,
not on imitating the cosmic process, but in combating it."7 So we seem to
have very strong intuitive, prima facie reasons to equate some of our inher
ited behavioral tendencies with that corruption of our natures that we are
so often exhorted to resist. We should therefore expect that the former can
serve as some sort of evidence for the latter.
We shall consider stronger versions of original sin in a moment, but
we have not thus far specified the sort of epistemic support we should
be seeking. Because I see no need to make this task any more difficult
than it needs to be, I suggest that we should begin with the weakest of all
epistemic support relations, what is sometimes called the relevance cri
terion of confirmation. According to this criterion, a body of evidence, E,
confirms a hypothesis, H, if and only if one's assessment of the epistemic
probability of H increases when E is added to one's belief structure. Now
the epistemic probability of any proposition can only be assessed relative
to some background set of beliefs (or perhaps knowledge), B. And so the
criterion for epistemic support that we should have in view is, I suggest,
the following:
P(H / (E & B)) > P(H /B)
where H is one of the versions of the doctrine of original sin, E is the col
lective deliverances of the science of evolutionary psychology, and B is
everything else that one might believe (excluding, of course, H, E, ~H, ~E,
and anything that entails H or E or ~H or ~E). Because B varies from per
son to person, this confirmation relation is also person-relative. But there
is no avoiding that, and it is not problematic. What counts as confirming
evidence for us depends essentially on whatever else we know or believe.
We must therefore proceed by assuming that there is enough overlap in
our background beliefs to enable us to come to rough agreement in our
assessments of the relevant epistemic probabilities. There is no need here
to consider stronger criteria of confirmation, because we are now asking
whether evolutionary biology can lend any sort of epistemic support to
original sin. The weakest of supports will suffice for that purpose.
In the case of OS1, we may assume that E includes the proposition that
human beings generally inherit at conception a strong behavioral tendency to
promote their own welfare at the expense of others. Let us also assume that B
includes the following propositions: It is almost always sinful (i.e., morally
wrong) to promote one's own welfare at the expense o f others, and It is very
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unlikely that a strong behavioral tendency will be resisted without exception
throughout the life o f any human being. If these are granted, then E & B to
gether entail OS1, and so P(OS1 / (E & B)) = 1. And whatever assessment
one might make of P(OS1/B), it seems clear that it must be less than 1.
Hence E confirms OS1. But that was too easy. Versions of original sin as
weak as OS1 are indeed obviously supported by evolutionary psychology.
So, let us add a little more content to OS1.
The first way we might strengthen OS1 is to add an inevitability re
quirement. So consider:
(0 5 2) Human beings generally inherit at conception a set of conditions
that make it inevitable that they will sin.
I take it that a strong behavioral tendency is the most that we can expect
from the science of evolutionary psychology, i.e., the inevitability we seek
is not to be found there. So, in order to preserve the support relation for
this version of original sin, we must make a corresponding adjustment
to B. The necessary adjustment is, I submit, quite reasonable. Let us add
to B the proposition that constant resistance to strong behavioral tendencies
throughout the life o f a human being requires a level of attention to one's volition
al freedom that far exceeds the natural ability of human beings. Then, because
that which is necessary is missing, it follows that it is inevitable that hu
man beings who mature to a certain point will sin. Because the suggested
addition to B is a psychological claim, one might wish that it have empiri
cal support. Unfortunately, I know of no research that either supports or
refutes the above modification to B. But if we may rely on introspection in
this case, I think the above claim is very hard to deny. We are very much
aware from personal experience how difficult it is to remain attentive to
our moral freedom to the degree required to ensure that we will remain
blameless at all times. Nor is it too much to claim that that level of atten
tion is simply beyond our psychological strength. I think we can agree
that this is a very reasonable modification, unless someone can refute it
by empirical research in cognitive psychology. We do indeed have that
belief in our set of background beliefs, or we will easily acquire it once we
consider it.8
We may now strengthen OS2 still further by specifying the type of in
heritance that is supported by evolutionary psychology. It seems clear that
if the conditions that make sin inevitable for us just are the behavioral
tendencies we inherit from our evolutionary past, then that inheritance is
a genetic inheritance. Now the inheritance of original sin through biological
procreation is also a significant feature of the doctrine of original sin as it
has been taught in a wide variety of Christian communities for a very long
time. And so we are now in a position to claim support for the following
historically affirmed version of original sin:
(053) Human beings generally inherit at conception a set of genetic con
ditions that make it inevitable that they will sin.
Although no additions to either E or B are necessary here, we should pause
briefly to anticipate two possible objections that might cause some to be
reluctant to accept OS3, regardless of how well it might be supported by
evolutionary psychology.
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First, someone might suppose that original sin, to be acceptable at all
in the modern world, must be regarded as a purely social phenomenon.
The idea is that something went wrong culturally at some time in the nowinaccessible mists of antiquity, and that a cultural corruption resulted that
has been propagated to all (or almost all) human beings ever since. If our
genetic inheritance plays any role at all on this view, it is merely to make
us compliant and conformable to social norms, especially during our for
mative years. But the content of the social norms could be anything, and
they in fact lead us morally astray only because we still suffer the negative
effects of some catastrophic cultural event many millennia ago. This view
might be held for a variety of reasons. It might seem attractive to those
who wish to retain some sort of historicity for the doctrine of the Fall,
despite having become convinced that the opening chapters of Genesis are
non-historic (or at least that the Fall narrative there is non-historic). It also
might seem attractive to those who view redemption in purely social terms,
and who seek to secure it by effecting social change. However, though the
historicity question will be considered below, we may effectively ignore
any general reasons someone might have for holding this view and focus
our attention on the very strong claim that original sin must be exclusively
cultural. There is no need to quarrel with the claim that many of the condi
tions we inherit at conception are social (i.e., cultural) conditions. In fact,
that much seems very clearly to be so. Nor is there any need to dispute
the claim that we have genetic predispositions to adopt the cultural norms
to which we have been predominantly exposed in our formative years.
Again, that much seems unproblematic, and it may likewise be supported
by empirical psychological research, evolutionary or otherwise. But it is
extremely problematic, in the face of contemporary evolutionary biology,
to deny that there is any genetic component at all in our inherited tenden
cies to sin. Though it is evident that some of our inherited tendencies to
sin are cultural, it is equally evident that at least some are genetic. The
confirmation relation that is presently under consideration, whereby OS3
is confirmed by evolutionary psychology, can stand as a decisive (in my
view) argument that some of our inherited tendencies to sin are indeed
genetic. (Recall that those who are convinced that original sin is a purely
cultural phenomenon may not simply include that belief in B, because it is
a denial of the hypothesis under consideration.)9 So if anyone is tempted
to view original sin as an exclusively cultural phenomenon, then it seems
to me that the claim of exclusivity should be given up. But this should be
a small price to pay, given that everything else one might believe about
inherited cultural norms remains intact.
Second, previous attempts to equate genetic behavioral tendencies
with some version of original sin have been met with charges of "Gnos
tic Dualism." The idea has been tainted ever since. In 1976, Donald T.
Campbell created a stir of sorts when he advanced the quasi-Freudian
view that original sin is the psychological tension created within us when
our genetically inherited tendencies lead us in one (morally wrong) di
rection while our culturally (or socially) inherited tendencies lead us in
another (morally right) direction.10By 1993, Philip Hefner had developed
Campbell's view into a doctrine of salvation as cultural transformation,
complete with a view of original sin that functioned in a way roughly
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analogous to the more traditional view (or views).11 But Hefner's attempt
was met immediately by a response from Langdon Gilkey on behalf of
theological orthodoxy (readers of Gilkey will recognize that this is not
a customary role for him). In addition to making the cogent point that
culturally inherited tendencies can frequently be quite perverse, Gilkey
expressed concern that Hefner had identified bodily existence as the
source of evil. According to Gilkey, Hefner had "listened too eagerly to
the siren songs of genetics!"12 In fairness to Hefner, it should be noted
that he had indeed stressed human freedom as a necessary condition
for moral responsibility. But regardless of whether Gilkey's concern is
fair to Hefner, we may set it aside with respect to the present attempt to
equate our genetic inheritance with original sin. It should be clear that
0 5 3 says nothing about a necessary connection between embodiment as
such, and sin. Even if it is true that our bodies supply us with sinful ten
dencies, it does not follow that all bodies must do so (Jesus is presumably
a decisive counter-example, though the virgin birth may be necessary
to ensure this), nor does it follow that all persons with sinful tendencies
are embodied. We may equate original sin with something we happen to
inherit genetically, and yet escape the charge of Gnostic Dualism by af
firming the possibility (and, in at least one case, the actuality) of sinless,
morally significant, bodily existence. Brief reflection will reveal that OS3
is consistent with the possibility of such an existence.
Let us now proceed to what is probably the greatest difficulty that
confronts any attempt to equate genetic inheritance with original sin,
and which may be the reason for the general reluctance of contemporary
Christian philosophers to avail themselves of such a simple and obvious
means of support for a distinctively Christian doctrine. This is the prob
lem of divine justice, especially when it is coupled with the view that we
human beings are somehow responsible for our own genetic inheritance.
And so, consider:
(OS4) Human beings generally inherit at conception a set of genetic con
ditions that make it inevitable that they will sin, and for which they
are morally responsible.
0 5 4 adds to OS3 what is sometimes called "original guilt," a doctrine that
is often associated with the Augustinian tradition. It turns out that it is
somewhat difficult to catch Augustine himself endorsing OS4 explicitly,
but that need not deter us. OS4 is an intriguing and widely held view in
its own right. Many have claimed Scriptural support for it from Psalm
51, among other texts, coupled with a definition of sinfulness that entails
moral responsibility. For that reason alone it deserves our attention, even
if it should turn out that Augustine himself did not really hold it. But it
also deserves the attention of anyone for whom OS3 seems plausible. That
is because it is difficult to maintain that we are morally responsible for
actual sins that are causally traceable to an inherited behavioral tendency,
without holding that we are also somehow responsible for the tendency
itself. Note that I did not claim that this was impossible, but merely diffi
cult. But if OS4 is true, then we are relieved of the need to give an account
of precisely where moral responsibility enters into the causal chain lead
ing to our actions. Similarly, if it strikes one as at least questionable that
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God would "stack the deck" against us by making moral obedience so
very difficult, then one has at least a prima facie reason to consider OS4 se
riously. If our condition is somehow our own fault, then there is no longer
any concern that God has unjustly stacked the deck.
But our immediate problem is that we seem to have a defeater for OS4
no matter how much support it might receive from E according to the
support relation we have been considering. Almost all of us have, in our
set of background beliefs B, the belief that it is not possible for any human
being to be morally responsible for any condition inherited at conception. Let
us call this belief, R. Since R entails that OS4 is false, it must be excluded
from the set of background beliefs against which the probability of OS4
is assessed. Nevertheless, because P(OS4 / R) = 0, we can be sure that the
addition of E to one's belief structure will not change the overall epistemic
probability of OS4. The support relation remains, but OS4 itself has been
utterly defeated. To rescue it, one must find a way to deny R. But R seems
so intuitively correct.
Nevertheless, I believe that R can be reasonably denied, thereby allow
ing the epistemic support OS4 receives from E to remain undefeated. To
argue for this, I will enlist the aid of the "Molinist" view of divine provi
dence that has been developed for the purpose of explaining the relation
ship between divine sovereignty and human freedom.13According to Molinism, there are contingent truths about what each of us would freely do
in any given set of circumstances, and God, omniscient as He is, knows
these truths about us (though He cannot alter them, lest freedom be com
promised). Thus far then, Molinism has nothing whatever to do with the
problem of reconciling original sin with evolutionary psychology. Yet, it
follows from Molinism that God knows what each of us would do if we
were placed in a set of "garden-like" conditions such as that described
in Genesis 2 and 3. These are the most favorable conditions imaginable
for passing an obedience test: no original sin at all, and a very pleasant
existence. We may then take the Genesis narrative to be, at the very least
and whatever more it may be, God's way of communicating to each of
us what we would have done in garden-like conditions. And presumably
God also knows that He would respond to our disobedience in the same
way that He responds to the disobedience of Adam and Eve in the biblical
narrative, i.e., by expelling us into a "fallen" state to live out our lives in a
"fallen" world (but with the possibility and hope of redemption). But, al
low me to suggest, if God knows all this, then He is free (in the sense that
there would be nothing morally amiss in it) to bypass the actual test and
bring us into existence directly into an already "fallen" world. The process
by which He might thus bring us into existence might well include an
inheritance of sinful behavioral tendencies and an environment of selfish
competitiveness, all of which we must learn to resist and combat as part
of the process of being redeemed. But because the truths about us that
God would base all these choices upon are indeed "up to us," we would
still be morally responsible for the "fallen" condition into which we were
conceived. And so adding Molinism to one's belief structure allows one to
expel R from it, and thereby enables evolutionary psychology to remain
undefeated in its service as epistemic support for a doctrine of original sin
as strong as OS4.
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A number of important questions arise at this point, but first it will be
helpful to view this application of Molinism from another perspective.
Keith D. Wyma has also noticed that Molinism might be useful for as
suaging concerns about divine justice in the doctrine of original sin. He
further notes that Molinism comports very well with what is sometimes
called the "representational" view of the Fall, and it provides us with
reasonable interpretations of some difficult Scriptural passages (such as
Romans 5:12-21). But Wyma stops short, I believe, of drawing out the
full consequences of Molinism. His excellent and insightful remarks are
worth quoting at length:
God, in considering whom to create and where and when to place
them, could make use of [His knowledge of what each of us would
do in any given state of affairs]. In creating Adam's progeny, God
could restrict Himself to the set of possible humans who would
freely have done as Adam did in the circumstances of his tempta
tion and fall. That is, I propose that the humans who exist, and who
have existed and who will exist, constitute some subset of those pos
sible humans who would freely have fallen just as Adam did. Thus,
Adam's rebellion becomes a kind of paradigm for all of us, since his
action represents what each of us would have done in his place. In
him, we all sinned, figuratively speaking.
Because of that, God can justifiably create us in the same state
to which Adam was putatively condemned. There's no point in
replaying the Fall over and over to the same result. It's as if God
said to Himself, "The first scene will always be the same, so let us
join the action in media res; begin with the second scene, where the
lives follow their own unique paths." This justification then helps
to make sense of why our state of original sin traces back to Adam.
Because we are the ones-who-would-freely-have-acted-as-he-did,
our relation to Adam allows the punishment his rebellion received
to be applied to us as well. His action stands in for ours; on account
of what he did, we too suffer the consequences and share in his
condemned state.
Moreover, this justification also confers some vindication for
God's creating us in a state from which we cannot fulfill his moral
demands. God knows that even if we were created with more per
fect moral capacities, like Adam's initially, so that we would be fully
capable of carrying out his moral commands, we still would not do
so, as Adam did not. Therefore, if we would not obey even if we
could, God need not ensure that we could. It would be useless over
development to give us increased moral capacities. For that reason,
setting the limits to our moral capacities truly does resemble setting
the boundaries of any of our other abilities; all such limiting falls to
God's unconstrained, free choice, since it is not a question of moral
obligation for God.14
Just so. But note that the view of original sin that Wyma has in view here
is not OS4, but OS3. When he does consider OS4, which he calls the "pre
dominant view on original sin," he explicitly denies that Molinism can be
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enlisted to justify it, and then goes on to declare that it "needs alteration."
The alteration he proposes is that original sin should not be regarded as
"grounds for guilt," but is instead a "state of innocent sinfulness" (emphasis
his).15 The latter is an extremely awkward locution that should be avoided
at all costs, but the idea seems to be that "original sin" is a misnomer.16
Other terms would capture the idea better, and Wyma himself suggests
"shortfall" as a possible substitute. This leaves Wyma with the task of ex
plaining how we can be blameworthy for the inevitable consequences of
the conditions we inherit at conception even though we are not blame
worthy for inheriting those conditions, and to his credit he goes on to take
up that task. I am not persuaded that his efforts are successful, but I will
not join that debate here. Let us focus instead on his reasons for rejecting
Molinism as a justification for OS4, because if they are found wanting then
there will be no need to alter OS4.
Wyma's objection to a Molinist defense of OS4 is, I suspect, quite com
mon. He appeals to our general reluctance to blame others unless they
have actually committed a sin. He writes:
If it's true that we would have rebelled as Adam did, it's one thing to
skip giving us his test, but it seems a much farther step to blame us
for failing it. As an analogy, take one of the unfortunate subjects of
Stanley Milgram's famous experiments involving authority and elec
tric shock. Suppose a test subject has displayed willingness to inflict
extreme pain on the word of an authority. Further suppose this con
firms that the subject would also have been willing to follow orders
in carrying out Hitler's genocidal plan in Nazi Germany. Let's say
then, that it's true of this subject that she would freely have helped to
commit genocide if her governmental authorities had told her to. Do
we then blame her for the Nazi atrocities? Does this counterfactual
concurrence make her guilty of those crimes? No; because although
she would have committed the acts, she in fact did not. Similarly, it
seems unjust for us to share Adam's guilt, as only he actually com
mitted the transgression in question.17
But this is not a good reason to think that God cannot hold us account
able for what we would do in conditions that are not actual. Wyma is
subtly asking the wrong questions here. He asks, "Do we then blame her
fo r the Nazi atrocities?" Well, of course not, because it is essential to the
"Nazi atrocities" that they be actions committed by the Nazis who actu
ally committed them. And so she could not have committed those atrocities,
although she would have committed her own atrocities. Or again, Wyma
asks whether she is made guilty of those crimes? No indeed, but we are
wondering about other crimes, namely, the possible crimes she would have
committed. If Wyma had asked about actions o f a type similar to that of the
Nazi atrocities, that would be another matter. But he asks his questions
about the Nazi atrocities specifically, and then appeals to the very strong
inclination we all have to give a negative answer to those questions as a
reason to think that none of us should be blamed in any way for what we
would do in non-actual conditions. But the latter conclusion does not fol
low from the mere fact that no one would blame her for the Nazi atrocities.
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So we should ask instead, "Do we blame her for the atrocities she would
have committed?" And the answer to that is not so obvious. There is an
ambiguity in the word "blame" here. If we are asking whether we would
punish her for what she would have done, then the answer is clearly "no,"
we would not. But if we are asking whether we would think less of her in
a moral sense, then the answer is clearly "yes." Our moral judgments are
not at all blind to what we think others would do in non-actual conditions,
though punishment does seem to be a response that is inappropriate for
us. If we think we know that someone would take a bribe if we were to
offer it to him, then we do think less of him. And that is a perfectly ap
propriate response, even though we do not call the police until he actually
takes a bribe.
Should we then conclude that God will likewise think less of us, but
that He would also be wrong to punish? No, we should not jump to that
conclusion either. We must ask why we would not punish even when we
would render a serious negative moral judgment. Perhaps the difference
lies in our ignorance, i.e., that we never really know what others would do.
And since punishment is somehow more serious than merely thinking
less of people, we are willing to base the latter on our fallible judgments,
but not the former. If that is correct, then God would be within His rights
to punish on the basis of counterfactuals, because He is not ignorant (pro
vided Molinism is true). However, this is not satisfactory. We must also
account for hypothetical cases in which we do know what others would
do, for at the very least God could give us this information in such a way
that we know it is coming from God. But it still seems as if we should not
punish, even if God were to tell us what others would do. Why is that? Is
it because it is always wrong for anyone, including God, to punish on the
basis of counterfactuals? Or does it have more to do with our perceived
authority to punish? I strongly suspect that it is the latter. We can just as
easily imagine cases where people commit actual crimes, and yet we have
the same mixed reaction of thinking less of them while yet being unwill
ing to punish them. We may want others to punish them, but we would
not do it ourselves. Why not?
I suggest that our intuitive judgments about whether we would pun
ish someone or not are based primarily on whether we think we have
the authority to punish, and we human beings never have anything more
than delegated authority to punish. Furthermore, the conditions under
which the authority to punish has been delegated to human beings seem
to be severely limited. A common view is that only those in the service of
a legitimate state, parents, and perhaps those whom parents have explic
itly authorized, may punish for moral wrongdoing, and even then only
when actual acts of commission or omission come to the attention of the
one in authority. No human being has ever been granted the authority to
punish on the basis of counterfactuals. These severe limitations on our
authority to punish are sufficient, I suggest, to account for our intuitive
judgments that we would not punish on the basis of counterfactuals. We
humans have never been granted the authority to punish on the basis of
counterfactuals, so that is why we think it would be wrong for us to do
so. But the source of these intuitive judgments is our perception of the
conditions under which we have been delegated the authority to punish,
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and not some universal moral principle that forbids all punishment on the
basis of counterfactuals. If there were such a principle, then why would it
not extend to a prohibition against rendering negative moral judgments as
well? I can see no reason why it would not. So we should not conclude that
God, who does not have to have the authority to punish delegated to Him,
and who does have the requisite knowledge, cannot act in judgment on
the basis of everything He knows about us. The door is therefore left open
for a Molinist justification of OS4.18
We might crack that door open just a little wider by thinking briefly
about what it means to be perfectly reconciled to God. This is, presumably,
a condition for which all Christians long and hope with great intensity.
It has also been promised to us by God Himself. But can anyone ever be
in such a condition if God knows that there are conditions such that we
would sin if we were placed in them? We have already seen that the rela
tionship between two persons is damaged when one of them knows that
the other would sin in a given set of non-actual conditions. There is no
reason to think that this principle fails if one of the persons is God. Thus
it seems to follow that the only persons who can be in a perfect relation
ship with God are those who would not sin in any set of present or future
conditions.19 But this is, I take it, a description of a completely redeemed
person. A redemptive process is therefore necessary if there is anything
about us that damages our relationship to God, and that includes its be
ing true of us that we would sin in some possible set of future conditions.
These conditions need not become actual, and we need not be aware that
we would sin if they were actual. God's knowledge of these truths is alone
sufficient to damage the relationship and place us in need of redemption.
And if it were somehow improper for God to act on this knowledge, then
it would be improper for Him to undertake the task of redeeming us and
we would remain forever in our unredeemed condition. So we should re
gard it as a very good thing that God is within His rights to act redemp
tively on the basis of His knowledge of counterfactuals. If it were not so,
we could never be redeemed.20
Finally, there is yet another historically prominent version of original
sin that is worthy of our consideration. However, in this case I do not
think it is possible to preserve the epistemic support that I have claimed is
enjoyed by the previous four versions of original sin. Some might wish to
further strengthen OS4 as follows:
(OS5) Human beings generally inherit at conception a set of genet
ic conditions that make it inevitable that they will sin, and for
which they are morally responsible, and which is a causal product
of the first sin of the first human being(s).
I suspect that one of the motivations for affirming OS5 is a desire to retain
some historic content to the Fall narrative. However, that is not a good
reason to affirm OS5. An historic Fall is consistent with OS4 alone (though
OS4 is also consistent with a non-historic Fall), and there are a variety of
possible historic scenarios one might construct that would not require one
to view original sin as the causal product of the first sin of the first hu
man being(s). I tend to be skeptical of such scenarios, partly because they
seem bizarre to me, partly because they can be dropped without loss of
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any significant (to me) doctrinal content, and partly because there seems
to be no way to decide between the possible scenarios one might imagine.
But in any case, those who are fond of inserting a historic "garden event"
within the larger flow of evolutionary development are free to do so with
out thereby committing themselves to OS5.21
But OS5 is destructive of any support for original sin that might be
forthcoming from evolutionary biology. The reason is that any plausible
candidate for the first human being will himself/herself have a significant
evolutionary ancestry from which he/she inherited the very behavioral
tendencies that we are now equating with original sin. So, he/she is al
ready in a state of original sin, at conception. So, unless someone can make
sense of backward causation, it is not possible for original sin to both be
the sinful tendencies one has inherited from one's evolutionary ancestry
and simultaneously be the direct causal product of an actual sinful action
that one has performed.22Evolutionary biology cannot support OS5 in the
straightforward and simple way that it can support the weaker versions
of original sin, even OS4 (provided Molinism is true). Therefore, in the
absence of a very good reason to prefer OS5 over OS4, the Christian com
munity should not (by insisting on OS5) cast off the epistemic support
that evolutionary psychology can supply for the doctrine of original sin.
Furthermore, OS4 does not seem to require any tampering with any other
doctrine that is regarded as significant by any prominent Christian com
munity, past or present.23And so, I say, we should all settle on OS4.24But
this would not be a case of settling fo r something that is less than what was
desired or hoped for, but rather a case of settling on a view that best in
corporates and integrates all of what seems to be the case from both faith
(Scripture and Tradition) and reason (our best contemporary science).25
Oklahoma Baptist University

NOTES
1. The addition of the word "generally" is intended to allow for a small
number of exceptions. All Christians will of course regard Jesus as an excep
tion. Some Roman Catholics will add Mary. Those who hold to an historic
"Fall" will make exceptions of Adam and Eve. Exceptions beyond that are
rare and even more problematic, but I don't wish to exclude them by fiat. In
subsequent definitions I shall omit the clause that follows the word "sin," but
it should be tacitly assumed in those definitions as well. I am intentionally
leaving vague and unspecified the relevant point of moral maturity, since it
certainly varies from person to person, and seems to remain vague even in
the case of a single individual. In formulating this and subsequent definitions
of original sin, I was helped greatly by Michael C. Rea, "The Metaphysics of
Original Sin," in D. Zimmerman and P. Van Inwagen, eds., Persons: Human and
Divine (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 3l9-56.
2. The word "sin" is used broadly here to refer to any sort of moral
demerit. It is restricted neither to wrongs directed specially or consciously
against the person of God, nor to actions and overt behavior, but extends also
to beliefs, desires, "attitudes," dispositions, and any other states of persons to
which one might wish to attach moral properties.
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3. Langdon Gilkey, “Evolution, Culture, and Sin," Zygon, vol. 30, no. 2
(June 1995), p. 300.
4. Keith Ward, Religion and Human Nature (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,
1998), p. 163.
5. For one such popular presentation of evolutionary psychology, see
Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Random House, 1994). Wright
is neither a biologist nor a philosopher, but a journalist. One might wonder
whether a thoroughgoing evolutionary ethical theory leaves any room for
what we really ought to do. That is a very important question, though we must
leave it aside for now. Wright writes as if he is entitled to moral categories
despite his account of their origin. For example, he says that “a good start
ing point would be to discount moral indignation by about 50 percent or so,
mindful of its inherent bias, and to be similarly suspicious of moral indiffer
ence to suffering. We should be especially vigilant in certain situations." (p. 343,
emphases mine). Or again, “chronically subjecting ourselves to a true and brac
ing moral scrutiny, and adjusting our behavior accordingly, is not something
we were designed for. We are potentially moral animals—which is more than
any other animal can say—but we aren't naturally moral animals. To be moral
animals, we must realize how thoroughly we aren't" (p. 344, emphases mine).
6. John Stuart Mill, “Nature," first published 1874, reprinted in vol. 10 of
J. M. Robson, ed., Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto
Press, 1969), pp. 398-99.
7. Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1989, first published 1894), p. 83.
8. Certain theological beliefs will also accommodate the inevitability re
quirement. Consider those who think that some motivations (such as a love
of God, or a desire to please God, etc.) are necessary conditions for full moral
rectitude, and that these motivations are not present in human beings “natu
rally," and that human beings can acquire them only through a special act of
divine grace. Such people already have a set of background beliefs that pre
serves the support relation for OS2. This is another case where that which is
necessary is simply missing, so that we must inevitably “fall short."
9. If another argument is needed, one might point to the apparent fact
that sin is not easily eradicated simply by placing human beings in positive
cultural conditions. Indeed, I take it that one of God's reasons for establishing
a Church (i.e., an organized community of the faithful) on earth is to supply us
with a morally positive cultural inheritance. But do I really need to convince
anyone of the difficulties involved? Original sin is definitely not a purely social
phenomenon.
10. Donald T. Campbell, “On the Conflicts Between Biological and Social
Evolution and Between Psychology and Moral Tradition," Zygon, vol. 11, no. 3
(September 1976), pp. 167-208. Note the contrast between Campbell's view of
“social evolution" and the one expressed in the preceding paragraph. Camp
bell represents the now-growing group of scholars that views a social moral
code as a fitness-enhancing trait of a group of organisms. There is now a vast
literature devoted to group selection theory and its potential to explain both
ethics and religion. Those who continue to maintain a negative view of cul
turally inherited behavioral tendencies will find their view loosely validated
by current work in “meme" theory, where self-propagating (and sometimes
parasitic) cultural “memes" function as analogues of biological genes.
11. Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Min
neapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993). For Hefner's treatment of original sin in
particular, and his development of Campbell's view, see chapter 8, “Biological
Perspectives on Original Sin" (pp. 123-42).
12. Gilkey, “Evolution, Culture, and Sin," p. 306.
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13. The name derives from the sixteenth-century Cardinal Luis de Molina.
One can make a reasonable case that Augustine and Anselm were Molinists,
though this is disputed. Recent development of the Molinist position has been
undertaken by Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint, and many others. For a thor
oughgoing contemporary defense of Molinism, see Thomas P. Flint, Divine
Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
Molinism remains controversial, but I think I can safely appeal to it as a very
influential and intuitively satisfying view that enjoys wide support and has
not been refuted (see also note 22 below). Since the debate about Molinism it
self is well underway, I shall consider in this paper only those objections to my
proposed application of Molinism that are not merely objections to Molinism
itself. This type of objection grants that Molinism is true, but then goes on to
claim that it cannot be enlisted in any attempt to rescue OS4 from the charge
that it is inconsistent with divine justice. Keith Wyma offers an objection of
this sort, which I consider below.
14. Keith D. Wyma, “Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin: Original Sin and Di
vine Justice," in Peter van Inwagen, ed., Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 268-69.
15. Ibid., p. 271.
16. This is also the view to which F. R. Tennant came to in one of the first
attempts to examine the doctrine of original sin in the light of evolutionary
biology. See F. R. Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1908). According to Tennant, “no natural im
pulse is itself sinful, unless present through our volition" (p. 104). Since he
saw no way that the behavioral tendencies we inherit from our evolutionary
past could be present through our volition, he concluded that such tendencies
are not sinful in themselves.
17. Wyma, “Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin: Original Sin and Divine Jus
tice," pp. 270-71.
18. This response to Wyma's objection remains neutral regarding the
proper goal of punishment. I have said nothing about whether punishment is
valuable for rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, or some combination of the
three, and everything I have said is consistent with any view one might have
about that.
19. Note that it is not necessary (for being in a perfect relationship with
God) that there was never a time when it was true of us that we would sin in
some set of hypothetical conditions. If that were a necessary condition then
everyone on this planet must forever abandon hope of ever being in a perfect
relationship with God. Rather, the necessary condition (for being in a perfect
relationship with God) is merely that there be no present or future time at
which it is true of us that we would sin in some set of hypothetical conditions.
20. There is a plausible interpretation of Jesus' teaching on adultery in
Matthew 5:28 that, if correct, would lend considerable Scriptural support to
the conclusion that it is just to punish on the basis of knowledge of counterfactuals. If Jesus is teaching that anyone who would freely commit adultery if
given the opportunity is in fact guilty of adultery, then the above conclusion
is strongly reinforced. For this point I am indebted to comments from Michael
Thune. However, I am not entirely persuaded that this is the correct interpre
tation of Matthew 5:28.
21. As far as I can tell, the only historic scenarios that would require a rea
sonable person to commit to OS5 are those that include the following: Prior to
an actual sin committed at time t no human being had any sinful behavioral
tendencies at all (i.e., there was no original sin), but after t and because of the
sin committed at t, all human beings had some sinful behavioral tendencies.
This scenario is indeed grossly incongruent with any attempt to equate original
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sin with sinful behavioral tendencies inherited from an evolutionary ancestry.
For the evolutionary process in view naturally confers on any human being
who is a product of it behavioral tendencies to assert himself/herself at the
expense of others (i.e., sinful behavioral tendencies). And thus the only way
there can be a time t at which no human being had any sinful tendencies at all
is for all human beings to have been miraculously preserved from the ordi
nary effects of the evolutionary process at all times prior to t. This is logically
possible of course, but I take it that most reasonable people will simply reject
the attempt to equate original sin with tendencies inherited from an evolu
tionary ancestry before they will accept such pervasive (and ad hoc?) miracu
lous activity on God's part. But it should be noted that the above scenario is an
extremely restricted one. Even those who insist that some human beings were
once in an historic state of “original righteousness" can reject it. For one might
suppose that a given pair of individuals was selected by God for an historic
test and were for that reason miraculously preserved from original sin (much
as Jesus Himself may have been through the virgin birth). These individuals
would then be in a historic state of “original righteousness." After their actual
sin, they may be somehow altered so as to share in the sinful tendencies of
their fellow humans (the ones who received their sinful tendencies through
the ordinary course of evolutionary development). They would then serve as
representatives of all their fellow humans based on God's knowledge of what
each individual would do in similar conditions. Though the sinful tendencies
of the individuals who are historically tested would be the causal product of
their own actual sins, the sinful tendencies of other human beings would not
be. And so it is possible to preserve a theologically significant, historic state of
“original righteousness" for some human beings without accepting OS5. The
latter scenario is sufficient to show this, regardless of whether one is otherwise
inclined to accept it, and regardless of whether there are other scenarios that
are likewise sufficient.
22. Molinism does entail that we have some counterfactual power over the
past, and thus the Molinist defense of OS4 that I have just recommended can
also be used to explain how death and suffering can be connected in some way
to human sin. But counterfactual power over the past is different from direct
backwards causation, and nowhere near as problematic. Time and space pre
clude a discussion of the complex issues involved here, but interested read
ers should consult the recent debate about the merits of Molinism between
Thomas Flint (pro) and William Hasker (con). Once again, I think I may safely
maintain that Molinism remains at the very least a viable option, and perhaps
even the best option.
23. This is important because several authors have claimed that any ad
equate Christian response to evolutionary biology must include some sort of
reinterpretation of the doctrine of the atonement. For a moderate example, see
Keith Ward, Religion and Human Nature, Chapter 9, pp. 186-203. For a more
radical reinterpretation, see Patricia A. Williams, Doing Without Adam and Eve:
Sociobiology and Original Sin (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), pp. 182
97. These reinterpretations of the atonement are held to be necessary because
we inherit our sinful tendencies from our evolutionary ancestry, and we could
never be blameworthy or in need of atonement on that basis. But this is just to
claim that OS4 must be false. I take it that if OS4 can be preserved, there will
be no reason to reinterpret the doctrine of the atonement (or any other histori
cally prominent doctrine).
24. Anti-Molinists must of course settle for OS3, but then it will not be so
easy to avoid any further doctrinal tampering. That is because, once again, it
is very awkward to think of ourselves as being in need of moral redemption
if we are in no way responsible for conditions that make it inevitable that we
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will be in need of that redemption. Thus OS3 creates considerable pressure to
view redemption in a non-moral way. Does this amount to an argument for
Molinism? That depends on how strongly one prefers OS4 over OS3 and its
doctrinal consequences. However, one might wonder whether the very fact
that Molinism can be applied to the problem of original sin in a promising
and satisfying way (and this much is granted even by Wyma, who rejects OS4
in favor of OS3) can itself be parlayed into an argument for Molinism. Such
an argument might appeal to the fact that Molinism was developed for the
purpose of explaining the relationship between divine providence and human
freedom, and not for the purpose of reconciling original sin with evolution
ary biology, or for finding support for the former in the latter, etc. Its useful
ness in dealing with the latter problems may then be loosely regarded as a
sort of “novel prediction," often thought by philosophers of science to be a
very strong epistemic virtue. Any theory that “bears fruit" beyond the original
stock of facts it was invoked to explain begins to look correct, and Molinism
may be bearing just that kind of fruit here. But this introduces a line of inquiry
that must be taken up elsewhere.
25.
I am grateful to all the participants of the “Nature in Belief" seminar at
Calvin College (Summer, 2004) for their help in the research and preparation
of the first drafts of this paper. I am especially indebted to Jeffrey Schloss and
David Vanderlaan, both of Westmont College. Likewise, thanks are due to all
the participants and attendees of the subsequent “Nature in Belief" confer
ence at Calvin College (November 3-5, 2005), and of the Society of Christian
Philosophers Midwest Regional Meeting at Notre Dame University (April 20
22, 2006), for helpful and insightful comments on a later draft of this paper.
Finally, thanks are due to the editor and referees of this journal for additional
suggestions that helped make it a better paper.

